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Jurisdictional Clauses in Consumer
Transactions: A Multifaceted Problem
of Jurisdiction and Full Faith and Credit
By RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER*
The problem of jurisdictional clauses in consumer transactions,
alluded to in the title of this Article, can be brought into focus most
easily by posing a simple hypothetical case.
Suppose Creditor C maintains an office in F-1, a state that has
not enacted any effective laws for the protection of consumers and
therefore has become a creditors' haven. Through its office in F-i,
C enters into a consumer credit transaction with Debtor D. The
latter resides in F-2, a state that has adopted stringent proconsumer
laws. The contract contains a clause to the effect that D subjects
himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of F-1. Alleging that D is in
default, C sues D in F-1 and recovers a judgment against D. Subsequently, C seeks to enforce this judgment in F-2.
In situations of this kind, the overriding question is whether the
F-2 court owes full faith and credit to the F-1 judgment. In trying
to answer this question, one starts from the fundamental proposition
that F-2 owes full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister state if
*
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(but only if) the F-1 court that rendered the judgment had jurisdiction. If D, by a general appearance, conferred unquestionable jurisdiction upon the F-1 court, F-2 would be constitutionally compelled
to enforce the F-1 judgment. The same would be true if D, by special
appearance or in some other way, had unsuccessfully raised a jurisdictional objection before the F-1 court. In that event, the so-called
bootstrap doctrine would preclude D from again attacking the F-1
court's jurisdiction when an action is brought in F-2 on the F-1 judgment.1 Thus it is fair to say that whenever the F-1 judgment is the
result of a contested proceeding, an F-2 court as a rule must give full
faith and credit to that judgment.
Presently, however, we are dealing with consumer credit cases,
and thus we can assume that the great majority of the judgments that
have been obtained by creditors in some F-1 state and are then sought
to be enforced in F-2, the state of the debtor's residence, will be in the
nature of default or consent judgments. In cases of this kind, the full
faith and credit clause would not preclude the F-2 court from examining the question whether the F-1 court had jurisdiction. The creditor,
of course, will claim that defendant's consent is an accepted basis of
personal jurisdiction and that, consequently, the F-1 court clearly had
jurisdiction by virtue of the debtor's consent, declared in the form
2
of the jurisdictional clause in the contract between the parties. If
such consent is valid, then the F-1 court had jurisdiction, and the
F-2 court must enforce the F-1 judgment.

1. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); In re
Acheson, 28 N.Y.2d 155, 269 N.E.2d 571, 320 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1971); Vander v. Casperson, 12 N.Y.2d 56, 187 N.E.2d 109, 236 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1962).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 32 (1971), and the
authorities cited in the Reporter's Note at 135-36.
An element of possible confusion should be mentioned at this point. Some jurisdictional clauses, especially those using the word "exclusive," raise two separate questions: first, whether the clause confers jurisdiction on the chosen court, and second,
whether it deprives all other courts of jurisdiction (or at least causes them to decline
jurisdiction). The present Article deals only with the first question. As to the second
question, see, for example, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972);
Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 491, 551 P.2d 1206, 131 Cal.

Rptr. 374 (1976); REESE & ROSENBERG, CASES AND
185 (1978); Juenger, SUPREME COURT VALIDATION

MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS
OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES, 19

L. REV. 49 (1972).
Judicial decisions in which the two questions are not kept apart inevitably sow
confusion. See, e.g., Leasewell Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1011
(S.D. W. Va. 1976).

WAYNE
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At first blush, this analysis seems to open a channel for creditors
to circumvent all of the protections which F-2 legislators have sought
to create for the benefit of consumers residing in F-2. When the
debtor, a resident of F-2, is sued in F-i, the debtor is faced with Hobson's choice. If he appears in the F-1 action, it is likely that the F-1
court, perhaps honoring a choice-of-law clause in the parties' contract,
will apply its own internal law, which is favorable to the creditor. The
result will be a judgment in favor of the creditor, and this judgment
clearly will be entitled to full faith and credit in F-2. If, on the other
hand, the debtor decides to default in F-i, the resulting default judgment again will be entitled to full faith and credit in F-2, provided
that the F-2 court gives effect to the consent contained in the jurisdictional clause of the contract.
I. The Outlines of the Problem
From the standpoint of F-2, which has attempted to aid resident
consumers by strongly protective legislation, the problem is a grave
one. If a debtor residing in F-2, by the mere act of signing a printed
form that contains a boilerplate jurisdictional clause, can validly
confer jurisdiction upon the courts of a creditor-haven state such as
F-i, then it is easy for a clever creditor to evade every substantive
safeguard provided to consumers by the laws of F-2. There appears
to be only one way to prevent such evasion: by invalidating the
debtor's consent upon which the jurisdiction of the F-1 court depends
in such a case.
A number of states, seeing themselves in the role of F-2, in recent
years have enacted express statutory provisions invalidating jurisdictional clauses in consumer transactions.3 The outstanding example
of such a statute is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), thus
far adopted in eleven states. 4 Ten states have adopted section 1.201
(8) which contains the following language:
3. The growing tendency to put restrictions on jurisdiction and venue in actions
against consumers, and ordinarily to permit such actions only at the place of the defendant's residence, appears to be world-wide. For a comparative discussion, see von
Marschall, Recent Legislative and Judicial Trends in Consumer Credit in Germany, in
ASPECTS OF CoMAxATnrE CommvsucrA_, LAw 166, 178 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster, eds.
1969).
4. COLO. REv. STAT. ANw. § 5-1-201 (1973); IDAHO CODE § 28-31-201 (Supp.
1977); IND. CODE § 24-4.5-1-201 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.1201 (Supp. 197778); KAN. STATS. ANN. § 16a-1-201 (Supp. 1977-78); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A,
§ 1.201 (Supp. 1977-78); ORI.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 1-201 (1972); S.C. CODE §
37-1-201 (1976); UTAH CODE AN. § 70B-1-201 (Supp. 1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
421.201 (1974); Wyo. STAT. § 40-1-201 (Supp. 1975).
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Each of the following agreements or provisions of an agreement by a consumer who is a resident of this State at the time
of a consumer credit transaction is invalid with respect to the
transaction:
(a) that the law of another jurisdiction apply;
(b) that the consumer consents to be subject to the proccess of another jurisdiction;
(c) that the consumer appoints an agent to receive service
of process;
(d) that fixes venue; and
(e) that the consumer consents to the jurisdiction of the
court that does not otherwise have jurisdiction.5

A similar rule prevails, at least arguably, in California. Section
1812.10 of the Civil Code in effect requires that actions involving
consumer transactions normally be commenced in the county of the
debtor's residence. This provision, which is mandatory, 6 is supplemented by section 1804.1(i), prohibiting any contract provision that
attempts to escape the venue requirements imposed by section 1812.10.
It is true that both of these sections speak in terms of venue rather
than of jurisdiction. One can make a strong argument, however, to
the effect that the obvious legislative purpose is attainable only by
invalidating every choice-of-forum clause seeking to circumvent section 1812.10, regardless of whether the chosen forum is within or
without the State of California.
Thus, if one includes California, there are at least eleven states,
5. The language quoted in the text is that of the 1974 Final Draft of the UCCC.
See 7 U.L.A. 158, 180-81 (Supp. 1971-77). The Iowa version contains the same language. In South Carolina, this provision has been omitted. In the other nine states
listed in the preceding footnote, older versions of the provision in question have been
adopted and are still in force. For purposes of the present discussion, however, it
may be assumed that these older versions, while less artistically drafted, are intended
to have substantially the same effect as the provision quoted in the text, that is, to
invalidate choice-of-forum clauses by which resident debtors purport to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of an out-of-state court.
For brief references to these provisions, see Miller, Some Conundrums in an Enigma:

Three Latent Consumer Credit Transactions Under the Oklahoma Version of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 241, 250 (1970); Miller & Warren,
1974 Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 23 KAN. L. REv. 619, 624 (1975); Spanogle,

Changes in the Present Maine Law Created by the Maine Consumer Credit Code, 26
ME. L. REv. 173, 180 (1974).
6. See 51 Ops. Atty. Gen. 179 (1968), cited with apparent approval in Barquis
v. Merchants Collection Ass'n, 7 Cal. 3d 94, 121, 496 P.2d 817, 837, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745,
765 (1972). See also CAL. CiV. CODE § 1788.15(b) (West Supp. 1978).

7. These include ten of the eleven UCCC states (excluding South Carolina),
supra note 4, plus California.
Even in states that have not enacted such a statute, it is possible that a similar
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(and the number appears to be growing) that invalidate jurisdictional
clauses in consumer transactions.
Returning to the hypothetical case stated at the beginning of this
Article, suppose F-2, the state of the debtor's residence, is one of the
eleven states just mentioned. In that event the debtor, when sued
in F-2 on the F-1 judgment, no doubt will argue that by virtue of the
F-2 statute the debtor's consent to the jurisdiction of the F-1 court
was void and that consequently the F-1 court lacked personal jurisdiction.. The soundness-of this, argument.hinges. on whether-it is F-2
law that governs the validity of the consent contained in the choiceof-forum clause. One may assume that under the law of F-i, a
creditor-haven state, such a clause as a rule would be valid and enforceable. Thus the validity of the jurisdictional clause, and ultimately the jurisdiction of the F-1 court, appears to depend on the
resolution (by the F-2 court) of a question of choice of law.
This choice-of-law problem is a difficult one. It is rendered even
more complex by the circumstance that it arises in the context of
judicial jurisdiction and of full faith and credit to a sister state's judicial proceedings, 7a that is in a context heavily impacted by federal
constitutional law. Neither courts nor legal writers have ever furnished a reasoned and systematic overview of the problem. It is the
purpose of the present Article to provide at least a checklist of the
many issues that must be addressed in order to arrive at such an
overview. 8
Before analyzing the problem of choosing between F-1 law (upholding the validity of the jurisdictional clause) and F-2 law (invalidating the clause), one must address the preliminary question
whether - apart from any such choice-of-law analysis and merely as
a matter of federal constitutional law and of F-i law - the F-1 judgment is necessarily valid. This preliminary question is treated in
Part II, infra. There will follow, in Part III, the choice-of-law analysis itself, and in Part IV, a discussion of the additional complexities
arising from the possibility that in some instances the F-1 court might

rule may emerge as a matter of decisional law, especially in cases where the contract
is one of adhesion.

7a.
8.
ment of
thorities

See text accompanying notes 91-92 infra.
The intention is to present an annotated checklist rather than a definitive treatthe many pertinent issues. For this reason, references to cases and other auwill be illustrative rather than exhaustive.
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have personal jurisdiction over the debtor even though the jurisdictional clause of the contract is ineffective.
11.
(1)

Questions Preliminary to a Choice-of-Law Analysis

Is the FA Action a Judicial Proceeding?

In a fact situation such as that set out at the beginning of this
Article, the defendant consumer perhaps will try, first of all, to raise
a fundamental argument against full faith and credit. The consumer
will point out that the proconsumer laws of F-2, which F-1 ignored,
embody an important public policy of F-2 and that the enforcement
in F-2 of this particular F-1 judgment would offend such public policy.
Under these circumstances, defendant will argue, F-2 is relieved of its
duty to give full faith and credit to the F-1 judgment. Some scholars
support the reasoning behind such a public policy argument. 9 In
practice, however, the argument would be unlikely to succeed because
the United States Supreme Court has squarely and repeatedly held
that a final sister state judgment (provided it is valid) is entitled to
full faith and credit, even though it offends a strong public policy
of the state in which it is sought to be enforced." °
A different - and possibly more promising - argument against
giving full faith and credit to the F-1 judgment derives from the very
language of the pertinent constitutional provision," which makes it
clear that an F-1 judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in F-2
only if the F-1 proceeding leading up to that judgment can be characterized as a judicial proceeding. In cases in which the F-1 judgment was entered by confession or by default, it may sometimes be
doubtful whether this requirement of a judicial proceeding has been
met. In Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine' 2 the New York Court of Ap9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1971), and the authorities cited in the Reporter's Note at 314-15. Attention should be called to the admission in the Reporter's Note that in formulating the black-letter text of § 103 considerable reliance has been placed on Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
10. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
Further
authorities (especially state court decisions) to the same effect are cited in Hopson,
Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit,
29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 133 n.136 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Hopson].
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
12. 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
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peals held that where the F-1 judgment was based on a cognovit
note and was entered by a clerk whose "duties are purely ministerial,"12a the F-1 proceeding did not involve "the exercise of discretion or judgment" 13 and hence did not amount to a judicial proceeding entitled to full faith and credit. If this holding is correct, many
judgments entered by confession are excluded from the operation of
the full faith and credit clause.
Moreover, the reasoning of Ezrine may well reach beyond fact
situations involving cognovit notes or other forms of confession of
judgment. In many states, a plaintiff who seeks to recover a sum
certain in a contract action, upon a defendant's default can have a
default judgment entered by a clerk whose "duties are purely ministerial." Run-of-the-mill default judgments of this kind would not be
entitled to full faith and credit if the Ezrine doctrine were carried to
its logical conclusion.
Law reviews' 4 and a federal district court opinion" have criticized
the above-mentioned holding of Ezrine. The holding, however, involves a question of federal constitutional law, and thus it is clear
that an authoritative resolution of that question can come only from
the United States Supreme Court, which has not yet spoken on the
point. Until the Supreme Court settles the question, the doubts
created by Ezrine may in many instances furnish arguments for consumers when they are sued in F-2 on an F-i judgment.
(2)

Is the F-1 Judgment Valid as a Matter of Federal Due Process ?

A due process attack on the validity of the F-1 judgment may be
based on either or both of two independent grounds: (a) absence
of proper jurisdiction or (b) lack of notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
(a) Concerning jurisdiction, the question to be addressed at this
point is whether federal due process (regardless of the law of F-1 or

12a. Id. at 230, 250 N.E.2d at 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
13. Id.
14. See Note, Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and Confession of judgment, 24
HASNGs
L.J. 1045, 1054-55 (1973), and references cited therein.
15. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1358 (D. Del. 1971), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 405 U.S. 971 (1972), opinion on remand 359 F. Supp. 124
(D. Del. 1972).
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F-2) may invalidate a consumer's advance consent to the jurisdiction
of a state other than that of the consumer's residence.
Until recently, courts and commentators generally assumed that
as a matter of due process such consent constituted a valid basis of
personal jurisdiction over the consenting defendant, even in the extreme situations where the consent was contained in a cognovit note. "
It was widely believed that this assumption was supported by the
well-known case of National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent. 7
In Szukhent a sharply divided Court upheld the validity of an advance
consent contained in a contract by which the defendant farmers leased
farm equipment from the plaintiff corporation. Mr. Justice Black's
dissent in that case placed much emphasis on the adhesive nature of
the contract, and as a consequence the majority opinion was widely
thought to imply that such advance consent to jurisdiction could not
be attacked on due process grounds, not even in cases where the defendant is a consumer and his consent is imbedded in a contract of
adhesion.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that, at least insofar as consumer
transactions are concerned, Szukhent is far less reliable as a precedent
than is popularly assumed. First, in the modern age of big agribusiness it is not at all certain that a farmer-lessee of expensive agricultural
equipment is the equivalent of a consumer."' Secondly, and more
importantly, Szukhent must now be read in the light of the Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement in Shaffer v. Heitner.19 Shaffer
held that every assertion of jurisdiction is subject to the test of fairness
and justice laid down in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.20 That test, therefore, will have to be employed not only where
alleged personal jurisdiction is based on the long-arm doctrine or on
defendant's presence, 21 but equally where defendant's advance consent furnishes the asserted basis of jurisdiction.
16.

See

AMERICAN

RESTATEMENT

CONFLICTS LAW

(SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,

53-54 (3d ed. 1977);

§ 32 (1971);

LEFLAR,

VON MEHREN AND TRAUTMAN, THE

663 (1965).
375 U.S. 311 (1964).
See CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES - COMMENTS QUESTIONS 589 (1975) [hereinafter cited as CRAMTON, CURRIE & KAY].
19. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
20. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
21. Until recently it was generally taken for granted that personal service upon
a defendant transiently present in the forum state (or flying over it) was a sufficient
basis of personal jurisdiction, even though the forum had no other contacts with the
LA-W OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS

17.
18.
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In future litigation, the broad principle announced in Shaffer will
compel the courts to confront and to answer these questions: Is it
fair and just to base personal jurisdiction over a non-resident consumer
on his advance consent declared in a contract of adhesion? Should
this question be determined once and for all as a matter of law, or
should its determination depend on the facts and circumstances of
each individual case, for example on the smallness of the print, the
understandability of the contractual language, the consumer's educational qualifications, his wealth or poverty, the strength of the creditor's bargaining position, the inconvenience from the consumer's standpoint of the chosen forum, the fairness of the other provisions of the
contract, and the myriad other variables of consumer transactions?
We do not know at the present time how the courts will answer these
questions. 22 It is by no means impossible that, when answers to
these questions come in, at least some jurisdictional clauses in consumer
transactions will flunk the test of fairness and justice and thus will be
23
held ineffective as a matter of federal due process.
parties or the cause of action. In an article published in 1960, this author called that
rule of transient jurisdiction a "scandalous anachronism." Schlesinger, Methods of
Progress in Conflict of Laws: Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment of "Translefit" Jurisdiction, 9 J. Pun. L. 313, 326 (1960). At the same time, however, I
cautioned that as a matter of existing law "the transient rule is still so firmly established
that as yet no lawyer has been bold enough to risk his client's money in a frontal attack upon the rule." Id. at 316. This statement was correct at the time (1960), and
there has not been any case involving such a frontal attack since then. For the future,
however, one can hope that lawyers representing victimized defendants will mount
due process-attacks on the transient rule. The Supreme Court's broad dicta in Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), now encourage such attacks.
22. There is some authority for the proposition that, insofar as due process is concerned, there can be no single rule covering all jurisdictional clauses in consumer transactions and that in each case the decision must depend on the particular facts before
the court. See Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App. 3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542
(1975).
23. A jurisdictional clause that does not specify the chosen forum but gives the
plaintiff-creditor a wide range of choice in selecting a forum is particularly vulnerable
on due process grounds. See Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d
474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
Note, also, that due process requires the use of clear and unequivocal language.
A choice-of-forum clause, even if it does not contain a waiver of notice, in effect always implies a waiver "of the constitutional right of due process with respect to the
right to be sued in a forum wherein in personam jurisdiction may clearly and properly
be obtained in accordance with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
An agreement to waive this constitutional right must be deliberately and understandingly made, and language relied upon to constitute such a waiver must clearly, unequivocally and unambiguously express a waiver of this right." Telephonic, Inc. v.
Rosenblum, 88 N.M. 532, 537, 543 P.2d 825, 830 (1975).
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The significance of these doubts created by Shaffer is not limited
to cognovit notes or to any other particular type of choice-of-forum
clause. In every future case in which the plaintiff asserts personal
jurisdiction over the defendant on the basis of the defendant's advance consent, it will be possible to attack such jurisdiction on due
process grounds if it appears that under the circumstances of the case
such basis of jurisdiction is less than fair and just.
(b) In some jurisdictional clauses, especially those of the cognovit type, 24 the prospective defendant's consent to jurisdiction is
coupled with a waiver of notice. The question then arises whether
such waiver will pass muster under the due process clause of the
United States Constitution. It is traditional learning that notice and
opportunity to be heard, like other constitutional rights, are susceptible
of being waived.2 5 In D. H Overmyer Co., Inc. v. Frick Co.,2 6 the
Supreme Court upheld the defendant's waiver of notice contained in
a cognovit note; but the Court emphasized that the defendant in that
case was a corporation, that the parties' contract involved a sizeable
commercial transaction, and that in drafting their contract both parties
were assisted by able counsel. The Court significantly added that
its holding would not be "controlling precedent for other facts of
other cases. For example, where the contract is one of adhesion,
where there is great disparity of bargaining power, and where the
debtor receives nothing for the cognovit provision .... "2,7 This
dictum makes it clear that an advance waiver of notice and opportunity to be heard is sometimes valid and sometimes invalid.
24. The discussion in the text assumes that the cognovit note is valid and enforceable under F-1 law. Many states outlaw such notes, but with or without procedural
restrictions they are still permitted in a number of states. A survey of jurisdictions
can be found in Hopson, supra note 10. For references updating this survey, see Note.
Cognovit Revisited: Due Process and Confession of Judgment, 24 HAST. L.J. 1045,
1046-48 (1973). See also REESE AND ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAws 59 (1978).
An F-1 judgment obtained in violation of F-1 statutory requirements may be invalid under F-1 law. See note 41 infra. The present discussion in the text, however,
assumes that the F-1 judgment as well as the underlying cognovit note is valid under

F-1 law.
25. See National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964).
Note, however, that the waiver must be unambiguous and that the authority conferred
by a warrant of attorney must be "strictly pursued." National Exchange Bank of Tiffin
v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 266 (1904); Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,
137 U.S. 287 (1890). See note 23 supra.
26. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
27. Id. at 188, see Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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Whether an advance waiver is valid or not, thus depends on
the facts of the particular case. 28 It follows that the defendant has
a due process right to a hearing at which the facts determining the
validity of the waiver can be shown. Among state courts and lower
federal courts there is controversy as to whether the F-1 court must
hold such a hearing before it enters judgment upon a cognovit note
or whether it is constitutionally sufficient to provide merely for a
subsequent hearing if and when the defendant moves to vacate the
judgment. 29 The procedural problem involved in that controversy is
an important one, but in the present context it is unnecessary to discuss it in detail because it obviously relates to F-1 procedure, while
the present focus is on the effect which the F-1 judgment will have in
F-2.

2 0a

From the standpoint of F-2 it is clear that unless the issue concerning the validity of defendant's waiver of notice has been explicitly
raised, litigated, and adjudicated in F-i, 30 such issue is not precluded
by collateral estoppel and hence may be examined and determined by
the F-2 court. Thus there will be instances in which the latter court
becomes the arbiter of that issue.
In F-2, a state that generally favors protection of consumers, the
court probably will tend to look with a jaundiced eye at a waiver of
notice contained in an adhesive consumer contract. Of course, where
the defendant consumer, in spite of the contractual waiver, actually
did receive proper notice of the proceedings, there is no violation of
the constitutional notice requirement.31 Where, as in the typical
cognovit situation, however, the waiver results in no notice being
given before the entry of the F-1 judgment, the F-2 court will treat
28.

Under some circumstances, even ca cognovit note issued by a corporation may

be vulnerable on due process grounds.

Northern Ohio Bank v. Ket Assoc., Inc., 74

Mich. App. 286, 253 N.W.2d 734 (1977).
29. Compare Virgin Islands Nat'l Bank v. Tropical Ventures, Inc., 358 F. Supp.

1203 (D. St. Croix 1973); Scott v. Danaher, 343 F. Supp. 1272 (N.D. II. 1972) and
Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978) with Tunheim v. Bowman, 366 F. Supp. 1392 (D. Nev. 1973); Billingsley v. Lincoln Nat'l Bank,

271 Md. 683, 320 A.2d 34 (1974) and Irmco Hotels Corp. v. Solomon, 27 Ill. App.
3d 225, 326 N.E.2d 542 (1975).
29a. It should be noted, however, that where the F-1 statute provides merely for
a subsequent hearing on the validity of the waiver, the F-1 judgment may arguably
be attacked in F-2 (as well as in F-i) on the ground of the F-1 statute's facial invalidity. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
30. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
31. National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
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that judgment as invalid unless the court must regard the waiver as
effective. The bare fact that the defendant is a consumer by itself
may not always suffice to invalidate the waiver on constitutional
grounds; 32 but together with other circumstances, 33 it may tend to
show that the contract is one of adhesion and reflects great disparity
in bargaining power. Once such a showing has been made,3 4 the Supreme Court's above-quoted Overmyer dictum will support the argument that the waiver, and consequently the F-1 judgment, should
35
be held invalid.
It follows that the effectiveness of cognovit clauses and of similar
waivers of notice in consumer transactions is clouded by serious constitutional doubts. These doubts - together with the other problems
noted above, especially those flowing from Ezrine36 - have not gone
unnoticed by creditors and their counsel. Expert observers have
stated that the creditors' general awareness of these doubts and difficulties "has tended to eliminate cognovit provisions from the consumer
field altogether. " 37 As a practical matter, therefore, one can assume
that choice-of-forum clauses in future consumer transactions will not
often be coupled with cognovit provisions or other forms of waiver
32. See note 22 supra. Note, however, that depending on the applicable law a
cognovit clause in a consumer transaction may be particularly vulnerable on statutory
grounds. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. Paoc. CODE § 1132(b); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW AND
RULES

§ 3201.

33. The Supreme Court of California, in speaking of cognovit notes, has said that
a layman debtor's "ignorance of legal matters makes it unlikely that he will understand
the character and effect of the instrument." Hulland v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 3d 440, 450,
503 P.2d 608, 614, 105 Cal. Rptr. 152, 158 (1972). See also Isbell v. County of
Sonoma 21 Cal. 3d 61, 145 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1978).
34. Most of the cases decided to date do not squarely face up to the crucial issue
of the burden of proof with respect to the facts on which the validity of the waiver
depends. The presumption of validity to which the F-1 judgment is entitled seems
to throw the burden of attacking the judgment on the judgment debtor. On the other
hand, it can be argued that there is a presumption against any waiver of constitutional
rights and that the burden is on the judgment creditor to overcome the latter presumption.
If correctly analyzed, the two presumptions do not necessarily contradict each
other. The presumption of validity of the judgment is overcome by a showing that
the defendant received no notice of the action. It is then incumbent upon the creditor
to assert that notice was effectively waived, and the presumption against waivers of
constitutional rights places the burden of proving the facts supporting that assertion
upon the creditor. See Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61, 68-69, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 372 (1978).
35. See note 27 & accompanying text supra.
36. See notes 12-13 & accompanying text supra.
37. CRAmTON, CURrE & KAY, supra note 18, at 593.
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of notice and that future F-1 judgments entered on the basis of such
clauses are more likely to be ordinary default judgments than judgments by confession. In the remaining parts of this Article, the author
will proceed on that assumption.
(3)

Is the F-1 Judgment Valid Under F-I Law?

38

According to the overwhelmingly prevailing view, the F-1 judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, and F-2 will not enforce

it, if under F-1 law the F-1 court- lacked competence.3 9 Assuming

that F-1 is a creditor-haven state, it is likely that F-1 law in general
will recognize a contractual choice-of-forum clause (unless it is tainted
by fraud 40 ) as a valid basis of its courts' competence. 4 1 Even a
creditor-haven state, however, applying section 2-302 of the Uniform

Commercial Code or a similar judge-made rule,42 will strike down a
contract clause found to be unconscionable.
The facts of ParagonHomes, Inc. v. Carter43 present an example
38. The question posed in the text relates exclusively to those rules of F-1 law
that directly determine the competence of F-1 courts. The further question, whether
the F-1 choice-of-law rule might indirectly invalidate the jurisdictional clause, and hence
the competence of the F-1 court, by pointing to the internal law of another state (e.g.,
F-2) outlawing such a clause, will be taken up as part of the choice-of-law analysis,
See notes 81-84 & accompanying text infra.
39. See Bell v. Staren & Co., 259 Ark. 506, 534 S.W.2d 238 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAws, § 105 (1971), and the authorities collected

in the Reporter's Note at 318.
40. See Bank of Waukegan v. Freshley, 421 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Ind. 1976);
Brone v. Golde, 267 N.Y. 284, 196 N.E. 58 (1935).
41. Note, however, that where F-1 statutory requirements have been violated in
obtaining the F-1 judgment, the F-1 court's competence may be found lacking, even
though the parties' contract contained a valid jurisdictional clause. See, e.g., Barnes
v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 257 P.2d 98 (1953); Rollenhagen v. Stevenson, 23
N.J. Misc. 219, 43 A.2d 173 (1945). For the somewhat odd subsequent history of
the Barnes case, see Barnes v. Hilton, 178 Kan. 645, 290 P.2d 1024 (1956). See also
note 29a supra.
42. Even in the absence of a statutory mandate such as U.C.C. § 2-302, an unconscionable provision in a contract of adhesion is apt to be invalidated by judge-made
law. See McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in
Procedureand Substance - Repossession and Adhesion ContractIssues, 26 HAsTiNGs L.J.
383, 417-19 (1974).
43. 56 Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 295 N.Y.S.2d
606 (App. Div. 1968). The Carter case was approvingly cited in Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (D. Minn. 1968) and in AaaCon
Auto Transport, Inc. v. Newman, 77 Misc. 2d 1069, 1072, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171, 174 (Sup.
Ct. 1974). See also Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.
U.L. REv. 1, 38-39 (1969).
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of a clearly unconscionable choice-of-forum clause. The contract involved in that case was between a creditor in Maine and a consumer
in Massachusetts. In the jurisdictional clause of the printed contract,
the defendant consumer submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the
courts, not of Maine, but of Nassau County, New York. The court
held that the clause was inserted into the contract for the sole purpose
of harassing and embarrassing the consumer-customer and for this
reason struck it down as unconscionable. 44 The result seems sound,
but the reasoning of the court applies only to the somewhat exceptional
jurisdictional clauses choosing a forum that is neither the debtor's
residence nor the creditor's place of business. In most jurisdictional
clauses, however, the chosen forum is the residence or place of business of the creditor; in such cases the debtor will be less likely to
succeed when he attacks the validity of the clause, and thus the basis
of the F-1 court's competence, on the ground of unconscionability or
44
on similar grounds bottomed upon F-1 law. a

I1.

Choice-of-Law Analysis

Suppose the jurisdictional clause in question turns out to be valid
under F-1 law. Suppose further that the clause, and the F-1 judgment based upon it, survive all of the constitutional attacks outlined
above. Can the F-2 court nevertheless treat the F-1 judgment as
invalid on the ground that the clause, which provides the necessary
basis of the F-1 court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant, is
invalid under F-2 law?
For purposes of the present discussion, it is assumed that F-2,
by adopting section 1.201(8) of the UCCC or a similar statutory provision, seeks to invalidate all jurisdictional clauses in contracts made
by resident consumers. The question, however, remains whether F-2
law governs the validity of the clause.
44. In cases of this kind it is possible, also, that the F-1 court will reach an essentially similar result by the use of an alternative technique. Where F-i, that is,
the forum chosen in the jurisdictional clause, is neither the defendant's residence nor
the plaintiff's place of business, the F-1 court sometimes will dismiss the action on
grounds of forum non conveniens, thus avoiding a determination of the issue whether
the clause is unconscionable. See Paragon Homes of New England, Inc. v. Langlois,
4 UCC Rep. 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); Paragon Homes of Midwest Inc. v. Grace, 4
UCC Rep. 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967); AaaCon Auto Transport, Inc. v. Newman, 77 Misc.

2d 1069, 356 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
44a. See Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Gagnon, 110 N.H. 279, 266 A.2d 207 (1970).
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There is a vast body of case law dealing with this thorny choiceof-law problem. 45 Virtually all of those cases involved cognovit notes
that were valid under F-1 law but void under F-2 law. The courts,
applying choice-of-law principles, sometimes turned to F-1 law, thus
upholding the jurisdiction of the F-1 court; in other situations they
held that F-2 law governed, in which case the F-1 court lacked jurisdiction. Insofar as cognovit situations are concerned, much of this
older learning is now obsolete because, as has been shown, the more
recent pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court probably
invalidate most cognovit provisions in consumer contracts as a matter
46
of due process.
A jurisdictional clause without a cognovit feature, on the other
hand, formerly was unlikely to raise a choice-of-law question because,
until the advent of modern statutes such as UCCC section 1.201(8),
such a clause ordinarily was valid under the law of F-2 as well as F-i.
Today, however, a statute of this kind, if in force in F-2 but not in F-i,
clearly gives rise to a choice-of-law problem. 47 A court struggling
with such a problem will tend to turn to the choice-of-law principles
formerly applied in the cognovit cases.
To spell out these principles is rendered difficult by the fact that,
even though many of the cases reach sound results, analytical reasoning is almost totally absent from the judicial opinions forming this
body of case law. It is submitted that utter confusion can be avoided
in this area only if the fundamental distinction between jurisdiction
(as a matter of due process, determined by United States Supreme
Court law) and competence (as determined by F-1 law) is kept in
mind. 48 The F-1 judgment is invalid if the F-1 court lacked either
jurisdiction or competence. 49 In a case in which jurisdiction and
45. For extensive references to the pertinent case law see Hopson, supra note 10;
Shuchman, Confession of Judgment As a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NOTRE DAME
See notes 64, 70 & 75 infra.
LAw. 461 (1961).
46. See text accompanying notes 16-37 supra.
47. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
48. "A judgment is valid only if it was rendered by a court which has been granted
power to entertain the action. Even though a state may have judicial jurisdiction,
it may not have given power to the particular court to entertain the action. In such
a case, the court was not competent to render a valid judgment .... ." RESTATEMENT
See also id. §§ 92, 105.
(SEcoND) OF CoNFracT oF LAWS § 92, comment i (1971).
49. Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 461-62 (1874); see RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLiCT OF LAws § 92, comment i (1971); Paulsen, Enforcing
the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IowA L. REv. 202, 208 (1957). See note
39 supra.
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competence both depend on the defendant's advance consent declared
in a choice-of-forum clause, it is clear that the validity of such consent must be examined in two steps. The first step determines
whether the consent is a valid basis of the F-1 court's jurisdiction.
The second step, which does not necessarily parallel the first but may
entail the application of choice-of-law rules flowing from a different
source, determines the validity of the consent as a basis of the competence of the F-1 court. 50
(1)

Choice-of-Law Analysis with Respect to Jurisdiction

(a)

Federal or State Law?
When the F-1 judgment is sought to be enforced in F-2, it is
necessarily the F-2 court that must examine the F-1 court's jurisdiction and, as an incident thereto, the validity of the jurisdictional clause
invoked by the plaintiff in F-1. The F-2 court, realizing that in a
multistate situation the applicability of F-2 internal law cannot be
taken for granted, will face the threshold problem of choosing the
body of law that will furnish the rule of decision with respect to the
validity of the jurisdictional clause.
The simple - and perhaps simplistic - way of tackling this
threshold problem would be to turn to the choice-of-law rules of F-2,
on the theory that every forum, when faced with an issue of choice-oflaw, normally applies its own choice-of-law rules. The Supreme Court
has recognized that a forum state has the power, either by statute or
by judge-made law, to fashion the choice-of-law rules to be applied
by its courts. 51 Only in extreme cases, when a particular choice-oflaw rule adopted by a state is wholly unreasonable, will the Supreme
Court interfere with a state's freedom to determine its own choice52
of-law rules.
A difficulty arises, however, from the fact that the choice-of-law
question presently under consideration (that is, what law governs
the validity of the defendant's consent contained in the jurisdictional
clause) arises upon the plaintiff-creditor's insistence that full faith and
credit be given to a judgment for which such consent furnishes the
50. The necessity of this two-step approach is overlooked in the otherwise valuable
article by Hopson, supra note 10, at 151.
51. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
52. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
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jurisdictional basis. Full faith and credit to sister state judgments
is basically different from full faith and credit to sister state statutes
(public acts). When a statute of F-1 is invoked by one of the parties
in a court of F-2, the court normally is free to apply or not to apply
that statute, depending on F-2's own choice-of-law rules. Only in
the exceptional cases mentioned above, 52a in which it would be wholly
unreasonable for the F-2 court to choose any law other than that of
F-1 in resolving the particular issue before it, will the United States
Supreme Court compel the F-2 court to apply the F-1 statute. The
rule concerning full faith and credit to sister state statutes thus is a
flexible rule of reason. In contrast, it is clear that, subject to minor
exceptions not relevant here, a state's duty to give full faith and credit
to the jurisdictionally valid judgments of a sister state is automatic
5
and absolute. 3

It is arguable, therefore, that when a choice-of-law issue arises
as a mere incident to what is essentially a due process question of
F-1 jurisdiction and a question of the F-2 court's duty to give full
faith and credit to the F-1 judgment, F-2 does not enjoy its normal
freedom to fashion its own choice-of-law rules. This argument is
supported not only by logic but also by seemingly potent policy considerations. If F-2 had the power, by the adoption of a particular
choice-of-law rule, 54 to invalidate the defendant's consent which constitutes the jurisdictional basis of the F-1 judgment, F-2 could easily
evade the duty to give full faith and credit to such judgment.55 if
accepted, this argument leads to the conclusion that a choice-of-law
issue such as the one presently under discussion, which arises as a
mere incident to a question of federal constitutional law, should itself be treated as a federal question. Indeed, one might even go a
step further and assert that under these circumstances federal law
should govern not merely the choice-of-law issue but the substantive
56
issue concerning the validity of the consent.

52a. See text accompanying note 52 supra.

53.
54.

See note 10 supra.
I.e., a choice-of-law rule pointing to the internal law of F-2, which invalidates

the jurisdictional clause.

55. For a counterargument, see note 59 infra.
56. If the issue were held to be governed by federal law, it would follow that
state statutes such as UCCC § 1.201(8) would be ineffective. Such a holding probably would lead to much pressure for federal legislation. See text accompanying note
93 infra.
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The Supreme Court, however, has not expressed itself clearly on
this point.5 7 In a fairly large number of decisions of state courts
and lower federal courts, the argument stated in the preceding paragraph has been implicitly rejected. Without discussing the existence
of a federal-state problem, all of the pertinent judicial decisions have
applied state law and state choice-of-law rules in determining the
validity of jurisdictional clauses. 58 Well-reasoned or not, these cases
must be recognized as reflecting the presently prevailing view. 5"
(b)

Choice Among Conflicting State Laws

If, in accordance with the prevailing view, one assumes that
state law is to determine the validity of the consent contained in a
jurisdictional clause, then a choice-of-law question (which state's
law?) necessarily arises.
This choice-of-law question involves two
separate issues which must be successively confronted: (i) what
is the source of the applicable choice-of-law rule and (ii) what are
the terms of that choice-of-law rule, or, in other words, to which
state's internal law does the choice-of-law rule point?
(i) In theory, there are three possible answers to the first
question. In looking for the source of the applicable choice-of-law
rule, one can turn to federal law, F-1 law, or F-2 law. The prevail57. In National Equipment Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the majority
applied federal rather than state law in passing on the validity of the Michigan defendants' consent to be sued in New York. This holding, however, was prompted by
the peculiar circumstances of the case. The action had been brought in a federal court,
and the jurisdictional clause involved in the case contained a provision by which the
defendants appointed an agent in New York upon whom process could be served. The
Court reasoned that the appointment of such an agent, because it is expressly covered
by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1), belongs to the sphere of procedure and that, consequently,
in a federal court the effect of such appointment is governed by federal law even in a
diversity case. The Court, however, did not address the broader question discussed
in the text.
58. See notes 64 & 75 infra.
59. It is not impossible to adduce rational arguments in support of the prevailing
view. To federalize the question of the validity of defendant's consent, or the related
choice-of-law question, would impose an additional burden on the Supreme Court, and
the time constraints operating on the Court may make it undesirable (and in practice
impossible) to expect guidance from the Court on such fine points of conflict of laws.
Moreover, the evasion argument stated in the text accompanying note 55 supra, while
theoretically appealing, perhaps will not carry the day in practice so long as the F-2
courts, applying state law and state choice-of-law rules, reach fair and reasonable results. Should a case arise where it is unreasonable for the F-2 court to apply its own
law (invalidating the jurisdictional clause), Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930), would supply the corrective.
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ing view has rejected the first of these three possibilities.6 ° There
remains, however, the task of choosing between F-1 law and F-2 law
as the source of the choice-of-law rule.
In support of applying the F-1 choice-of-law rule, which normally favors the creditor, 61 one might argue as follows: if the defendant
had raised the jurisdictional objection in F-i, it is probable that the
F-1 court, in considering the validity of defendant's consent, would
have applied its own choice-of-law rule; if, on that basis, the F-1
court had ultimately held that it had jurisdiction, the defendant could
not later question such holding in any other state. 62 This result, the
argument runs, should not be changed by virtue of the fact that the
defendant defaulted in F-1 and now seeks to raise the same issue in
another forum. Notwithstanding its surface plausibility, however,
the argument is not convincing. If one accepts the application of
state law and of state choice-of-law rules, the possibility of different
outcomes in different forums has to be faced, as in most conflicts
situations. That possibility, therefore, does not furnish a forceful
argument against the application of the simple, fundamental, and
generally recognized principle that the forum (here F-2), when confronted with a choice-of-law problem, applies its own choice-of-law
rules.
Nor can an argument in favor of applying F-1 choice-of-law rules
be derived from the fact that the ultimate issue here goes to the
jurisdiction of the F-1 court. It must be remembered that presently
we are dealing with jurisdiction as distinguished from competence. 3
The F-1 court's jurisdiction does not depend on F-1 law, and hence
there is no reason whatsoever why the F-2 court in this context should
borrow F-1 choice-of-law rules.
The courts, without even discussing the problem of the source
of the applicable choice-of-law rule, consistently and unanimously
have applied the choice-of-law rule of F-2.6 4 For the reasons just
60.
61.

See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
See text accompanying note 70 infra.

62.
63.

See note 1 supra.
See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.

64.

See note 45 supra. See Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co.,

74 F.2d 790 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 732 (1935); Bank of Waukegan v. Freshley, 421 F. Supp. 1033 (W.D. Ind. 1976); Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228

Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934); Ohio Bureau of Credits v. Steinberg, 29 Ala. App. 515,
199 So. 246 (1940); Carlton v. Miller, 114 Cal. App. 272, 299 P. 738 (1931); Egley
v. T.B. Bennett & Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924); McDade v. Moynihan, 330
Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953).
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stated, this approach appears sound even as a matter of theory, provided one accepts the premise that the validity of a jurisdictional
clause is to be detennined by state law and state choice-of-law rules. 65
(ii) We now turn to the question of the terms of the choice-oflaw rule that an F-2 court should follow.6 To what state's internal
law does that choice-of-law rule point?
The defendant's jurisdictional consent is contained in a contract.
Thus the usual approach is to view the problem as one of choice of
law with respect to the validity and effect of a contract or contract
clause. The trouble is that this subject is one of the most controversial ones in the entire field of conflict of laws.67
In other contexts, the contracting parties can avoid many of the
difficulties arising from controversial choice-of-law rules by writing
a clear choice-of-law clause into their contract.s In the context of
a consumer transaction, however, one finds that F-2, which (we assume) has enacted the UCCC or similar legislation, invalidates not
only jurisdictional clauses but also, by way of a statutory choice-oflaw provision, most contract clauses relating to choice of law.69 It
follows that a choice-of-law clause contained in a consumer contract
normally will not influence the court's choice of the applicable law.
Until the conflicts revolution of the past thirty years, it was the
prevailing rule that issues going to the validity of a contract or contract clause were governed by the law of the place where the contract
had been "made"; occasionally, the law of the place of performance
65.

In a diversity case, a federal court sitting in F-2 likewise will have to apply

the F-2 choice-of-law rule.
493 (1941);

See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,

Bank of Waukegan v. Freshley, 421 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (W.D. Ind.

1976).
66. As this Article has previously mentioned, any choice-of-law rule of F-2 may
be overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court if it is thought to be wholly unreasonable.
See text accompanying note 52 supra. It takes an extreme case, however, to trigger
this kind of Supreme Court interference. It seems very doubtful whether any of the
choice-of-law approaches to be discussed forthwith in the text are so unreasonable
as to invite such interference.
67. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 147 (1974).
68. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
See also

U.C.C. § 1-105(l).

69. See UCCC § 1.201(8) (quoted in the text accompanying note 5 supra). For
a more general discussion of choice-of-law clauses in contracts of adhesion, see A.
EHIRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 150-51 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAws § 187, Comment b & Reporter's Notes (1971); R. WEINTRAUB,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 274 (1971).
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was applied. It is easy for a clever creditor to manipulate the trans-

action in such a way that the contract is "made" and to be performed
in F-i. Thus, it is not surprising to find that in the majority of cases

this older view led to the application of the internal law of F-I, with
the result that the F-2 court upheld the validity of the jurisdictional

clause and enforced the F-1 judgment. 70

Only in exceptional situa-

tions, where the creditor or his counsel had neglected to employ the
usual boilerplate devices fixing the place of making and of performance in F-i, did the F-2 courts reach a result more favorable to the

debtor. 71

Modem approaches to choice of law, however, are likely to bring
about a drastic change. These modem approaches, which have been
adopted in the great majority of states, are predicated upon a grouping of contacts, 72 upon "the most significant relationship to the transaction,"73 or upon governmental interests analysis, 74 and thus introduce a great deal of flexibility into the choice-of-law process. A
court in F-2, by using one of these flexible approaches, will always

be able to adduce respectable reasons for applying the law of the
consumer's domicile, that is, F-2 law, and thus to treat the jurisdictional clause as invalid.7r It must be remembered, moreover, that the
70. See, e.g., Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Farmers' Peanut Co., 74 F.2d 790 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 732 (1935); Bank of Waukegan v. Freshley, 421 F. Supp.
1033 (W.D. Ind. 1976); Egley v. T.B. Bennett Co., 196 Ind. 50, 145 N.E. 830 (1924);
McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953). See also note 45
supra.
71. See Monarch Refrigerating Co. v. Faulk, 228 Ala. 554, 155 So. 74 (1934);
Ohio Bureau of Credits v. Steinberg, 29 Ala. App. 515, 199 So. 246 (1940). See also
Hopson, supra note 10, at 135-36.
72. Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
73. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 188 (1971).
74. See Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEx. L. BEy. 141 (1967).
The Supreme Court of California has adopted the governmental interests approach
in tort cases. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr.
215 (1976); Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 556, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106 (1974). The sweeping language of these opinions may foreshadow the adoption
of the same approach in contract cases. But cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588,
360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), a contract case in which the court expressed
itself as favoring a modem approach but reached a result that is somewhat difficult
to reconcile with pure governmental interests analysis. For an interesting discussion
of Bernkrant, see CRAMTON, CuanR & KAY, supra note 18, at 289-92.
75. Even before the advent of modem choice-of-law theories, this result was
reached in the decisions of some intermediate appellate courts in New York. Scanlon
v. Kuehn, 225 App. Div. 256, 232 N.Y.S. 592 (1929); Baldwin Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Klein, 136 Misc. 752, 240 N.Y.S. 804 (Sup. Ct. 1930), aff'd without opinion, 230 App.
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Uniform Commercial Code covers transactions (including consumer
transactions) involving a sale of goods. By an express statutory
choice-of-law rule, 76 that Code favors the application of forum law
whenever the transaction bears "an appropriate relation" to the forum.7 7 This forum-oriented rule78 will furnish additional support for
the application of the F-2 statute prohibiting jurisdictional clauses.
Even when the Uniform Commercial Code does not cover the transaction, the court can derive the same result from the prohibitory
statute itself. In order to attain its purpose, such a statute, " must
be interpreted as containing not only an internal-law prohibitory
rule but also an implicit choice-of-law rule mandating that the statutory prohibition be applied to all jurisdictional clauses that appear in
contracts with consumers residing in F-2. This implicit statutory
choice-of-law rule is, of course, binding on the F-2 court.8 0
The end result of this analysis is that in the future the F-2 court
is likely to apply its own statute striking down the jurisdictional
clause. Thus, the court will conclude that the clause did not confer
jurisdiction on the F-1 court.
(2)

Choice.of.Law Analysis with Respect to Competence

The F-1 court's competence, by definition, depends on F-1 law.s'
Therefore, when an incidental choice-of-law question arises in deterContra, Morris v. Douglass, 237 App. Div. 747,
Div. 832, 244 N.Y.S. 899 (1930).
The authority of the latter case, however, has been weakened,
262 N.Y.S. 712 (1933).
if not destroyed, by Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
76. U.C.C. § 1-105(1).
77. Even if not directly applicable, U.C.C. § 1-105(1) might be invoked by way
of analogy. See U.C.C. § 1-102.
78. The commentators criticize, and some of them seek to overcome, the forumorientation of U.C.C. § 1-105, but they cannot deny that in practice the provision
favors the application of forum law. See Nordstrom & Ramerman, The Uniform Colnmercial Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 623, 634-45; Siegel, The U.C.C.
and Choice of Law: Forum Choice or Forum Law? 21 AM. U.L. REV. 494 (1972).
Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L. REV. 399, 418 (1968); Weintraub,
Choice of Law for Products Liability: The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
and Recent Developments in Conflicts Analysis, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1436-37 (1966).
79. See, e.g., UCCC § 1.201(8), quoted in the text accompanying note 5 supra.
80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1). At this point
in the analysis, it is assumed that the source of the choice-of-law rules to be applied
by the F-2 court is neither federal law nor F-1 law. See text accompanying notes
58-59, 63-65 supra.
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105 Comment b (1971)
See also notes 48-49 supra.
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mining competence, even an F-2 court should resort to F-1 choice82
of-law rules.
In dealing with the issue of the validity of the choice-of-forum
clause (which, we presently assume, is the sole basis of the F-1 court's
competence), to what state's internal law does the F-1 choice-of-law
rule point? If F-1 has retained an old-fashioned approach to choice
of law, it will apply the internal law of the place of contracting or
of the place of performance. This approach, as has been shown, 62a
ordinarily will lead to the application of F-1 law, under which the
clause is valid. 3 If, on the other hand, F-1 belongs to the majority
of states where more modem choice-of-law principles have been
adopted, it may well be possible for the F-2 court to conclude that,
even under F-1 choice-of-law rules, the internal law of the place of
the consumer's residence should be applied, with the result that the
choice-of-forum clause must be regarded as invalidated by the F-2
8 4
statute and that the F-1 court therefore lacked competence.
What, then, is the bottom line of this choice-of-law analysis?
From the creditor's point of view, the bottom line is discouraging.
The F-1 judgment must be treated as invalid if the F-1 court lacked
either jurisdiction or competence. s5 The choice-of-law analysis has
shown that when the F-2 court examines the validity of the F-1 judgment, it will very frequently find a lack of jurisdiction and in some
instances a lack of competence to boot.
IV.

Additional Complications:

Concurrent Long-Arm

Jurisdiction
A creditor who sues in F-2 on the F-1 judgment often will assert
that the F-1 court had jurisdiction on two concurrent bases: consent
82.

See Hopson, supra note 10, at 151.

From the standpoint of the F-2 court,

such reference to the whole law (including the choice-of-law rules) of F-1 perhaps in-

volves renvoi, but as it would be senseless for an F-2 court, in dealing with the question of the F-1 court's competence, to reach a result different from that which F-1

would reach, this application of the renvoi doctrine is clearly justified.
MENT (SEcoN)

OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 8(2), (3)

See REsTATE-

(1971).

82a. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
83.

See Hopson, supra note 10, at 152-54, and authorities cited therein.

84. Id. Note, however, that when the F-2 court treats an F-1 judgment as invalid under F-1 law, the F-2 court's interpretation and application of F-1 law is subject
to review by the United States Supreme Court. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581
(1951); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
85. See note 49 supra.
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If the defendant's consent contained in the jurisdic-

tional clause is held invalid, the plaintiff will then argue that there
was nevertheless a sufficient long-arm basis for the F-1 court's jurisdiction. Is this a sound argument in the context of consumer transactions?"6
In the somewhat exceptional cases in which a nonresident consumer traveled to the state of the seller and there purchased at the
seller's store, the courts of that state may well have long-arm jurisdiction over the defendant consumer.8 7 Usually, however, an interstate consumer contract is concluded by mail or telephone and thus
involves no physical presence or activity of the defendant consumer
in F-i, the state where the creditor has his place of business. In this
of F-1 long-arm jurissituation, the courts tend to deny the existence
88
F-2.
in
residing
diction over a consumer
The same rule is likely to prevail where the nonresident consumer is a borrower who signed the promissory note outside of the
forum state. Even as to nonconsumer borrowers, long-arm jurisdiction under these circumstances is somewhat doubtful;89 a fortiori,
there can be no long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident consumerborrower who has never been physically present in the forum state.
There is, moreover, another recent development that will give
a creditor pause before he uses long-arm or consent as a jurisdictional
basis for an action in F-1 against a consumer residing in F-2. In at
86. In the discussion which follows, this Article will assume that F-1 has adopted
a long-arm statute going to the full length of what is constitutionally permitted under
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
87. See Harry Winston, Inc. v. Waldfogel, 292 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
ci. Dwyer v. District Court, 532 P.2d 725 (Colo. 1975).
Similar considerations might arguably support F-1 long-arm jurisdiction over a
borrower residing in F-2 who has executed his promissory note in F-i. Cf. First Nat']
Bank of Kansas City v. Ward, 380 F. Supp. 782, 784-85 (W.D. Mo. 1974) and authorities cited therein (but note that the facts are not clear as to whether the defendant
in that case was a consumer).
88. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 232-33
(6th Cir. 1972) (dicta); Nordberg Div. of Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Hudson Eng. Corp.,
361 F. Supp. 903, 906-07 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (dicta). See also Geneva Indus., Inc. v.
Copeland Constr. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 186, 188 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Darby v. Superior
Supply Co., 224 Tenn. 540, 458 S.W.2d 423 (1970).
89. See Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity Mtg. Investors, 510 F.2d 870, 873 (2d
Cir. 1975); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 425 F. Supp. 1365,
1370-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), and authorities cited therein.
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least one instance, the Federal Trade Commission enjoined the creditor from bringing such actions, on the ground that the practice of
suing a mail order customer hundreds or thousands of miles away
from his home constituted an unfair business practice within the
meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.90 On
appeal, the Commission's action was upheld. 91 The practical significance of this holding is considerable. It means that a creditor engaging in such a practice may invite trouble for itself, even though
its customers, acting individually, rarely have access to sufficient legal
assistance to raise jurisdictional objections either in F-1 or in F-2.
From the standpoint of consumers as a group, such Commission action is a much more effective remedy than the occasional dismissal,
in some F-2 court, of an action brought by the creditor against an
individual consumer upon an F-1 default judgment.
In the majority of situations involving creditors' attempts to collect from consumers, it is thus unlikely that, in the future, many
creditors will try, and even less likely that they will try successfully,
to "long-arm" consumer defendants.
Conclusions
Some of the points discussed above may be technical, complex,
and occassionally controversial. The conclusions that finally emerge,
however, are surprisingly simple.
(1) Most of the doubtful questions we have encountered along
the road could be resolved by congressional legislation. Article IV,
section 1 of the United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
It is arguable that this constitutional provision authorizes Congress to define the jurisdictional requirements that a state court judgment must meet in order to be entitled to full faith and credit in a
92
sister state.

90.
91.
92.
U.S. (5

15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976).
It should be remembered, also, that since the time of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
Otto) 714 (1878), the Supreme Court has exercised the power to impose limits
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In the past, Congress has not enacted any legislation implementing the full faith and credit clause, except the single provision of
28 U.S.C. section 1738, which deals with the formalities of authentication of sister state judgments but not with jurisdictional requirements. 93 It seems that traditionally Congress has been reluctant to
enter the field of interstate conflict of laws, which in general does
not have much political interest. This Article, it is true, deals with
an issue directly related to the regulation of consumer credit, an
area in which Congress has been active in recent years. There is,
nevertheless, no present indication of any strong desire on the part
of Congress to grapple with conflicts issues of the kind discussed in
this Article.
(2) Absent congressional action, most of the doubts and difficulties discussed herein could be authoritatively resolved only by the
United States Supreme Court. That Court, however, while it has
announced some helpful guiding principles, has shown itself disinclined to meet the practitioner's need for more light on the minutiae
of choice of law, jurisdiction, and full faith and credit. Thus, it
would not be prudent to expect that all of the doubts and difficulties
mentioned above will disappear in the near future.
(3) In the face of these doubts and difficulties, a creditor who
sells or lends to nonresident consumers, would be ill-advised to choose
a collection method that involves the use of jurisdictional clauses or
of long-arm jurisdiction.

94

Focusing specifically on jurisdictional clauses, this Article has
shown that such a clause is apt to be without any practical value for
on the jurisdiction of state courts and that the basis of this power is the Fourteenth

Amendment. Congressional legislation in this area may, therefore, derive additional
underpinning from section 5 of that Amendment.
93. Note, however, that the proposed new Federal Criminal Code, S.1437, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), as recently amended and passed by the Senate, contains a
provision which, if adopted by the House, would mark an initial entry of Congress
into this field. The provision in question, which is somewhat similar to H.R. 988,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) and S.797, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) would add a
new section 1738A to U.S.C. Title 28. The thrust of the new section would be to
define state court jurisdiction in interstate disputes involving child custody and to
require that full faith and credit be accorded to custody determinations made by a
state court having jurisdiction in accordance with such definition.
94. There are indications that merchandising firms doing a large volume of business
with out-of-state consumers are in agreement with the statement in the text and are
abandoning the former practice of suing such consumers at the creditor's place of business. See Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C., 540 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the creditor if the debtor resides (and all of his property is located)
in one of the growing number of states that have enacted a statute
such as section 1.201(8) of the UCCC. Even if the debtor's state
has not adopted such legislation, there are grave doubts whether a
choice-of-forum clause in a typical consumer contract will effectively
confer jurisdiction on the chosen forum.
The web of constitutional, statutory, and common law rules from
which these conclusions derive is remarkably and regrettably complex. To some extent, such complexity may constitute part of the
price we pay for our federal system, and thus may be unavoidable.
The rules guiding courts and parties in this area of the law are not
as elegant and clear-cut as they would be if they had been promulgated by an all-powerful and all-wise Philosopher King. Yet, by the
imperfect and often tortuous methods of lawmaking in a democratic
and pluralistic society, we seem to be reaching, or at least approaching, a fair solution. The combined efforts of legislators, courts, administrative agencies, and scholars have brought us reasonably close
to general acceptance of the healthy principle that a collection suit
against a consumer, even if it arises out of a multistate transaction,
ordinarily must be brought in a forum near the defendant's home,
and that this principle cannot easily be bent by a boilerplate clause
in a standard contract.

